Effects of continuous variation on the strategic stability of conventions
Mike Mesterton-Gibbons,
On sabbatical from the Department of Mathematics,
Florida State University
Abstract
Conventions--rules for conflict avoidance--abound in animal social life and often rely on arbitrary cues.
Consider, for example, the coordination problem faced by territorial neighbors: each would like to obtain more
space than the other is willing to yield, yet both suffer if there is a prolonged dispute over boundary locations.
A game-theoretic model shows that neighbors may be favored to place boundaries at the position of a conspicuous
landmark even when the size of the resulting territory is smaller than could be obtained through escalated fighting.
Another example of a convention, explored by a second model, is the age-based (older dominates younger) reproductive
queue that is observed in certain species of wasp. In both cases, the shape of the distribution of a continuous
variable--e.g., strength or lifespan--affects the strategic stability of a convention.
